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The Communicative Wheel: Symptom, Signal and Model in Multimodal Communication 
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and 
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Abstract: 
 
This paper addresses the need for a model of communication with a new, holistic conception of 
language within it. The resultant process model is called the Communicative Wheel. It consists of 
three communicative products: the sender’s input corresponding to his/her experience of a situation 
(symptom), an output corresponding to a piece of information to the receiver (signal), and the 
receiver’s intake corresponding to a description of the situation referred to (model). What the model 
of the wheel suggests, is that the understanding of ‘utterance’ as symbolic needs to be replaced by 
an understanding of it as indexical. 
 
Keywords: input, output, intake; symptom, signal, model; experience, information, situation; 
precoding, encoding, decoding; gift package, communicative gift.   
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The Communicative Wheel: Symptom, Signal and Model in Multimodal Communication 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since its institutional inception, the field of communication study has proposed various models, 
utilizing different perspectives. Certainly since Shannon (1948), through the media-orientated 
models of the 1950s (see Cobley 2006, Part 1, Vol. 1), communication models have tended to 
represent the disciplines whence they emanated (Craig 1999). While there have traditionally been 
basic S-M-R models, supplemented by gatekeeping, diffusion, effects and audience-centered 
models of communication, there are also models of communication that focus on economics, 
norms, biology, systems, cognition, efficiency and so on (Cobley and Schulz 2013a) such that the 
field harbours an often unrealized potential for dialogue (Craig 2015). More broadly, 
communication science has been almost exclusively concerned with human communication 
processes and the settings for those (Cobley and Schulz 2013b); inevitably, then, it has been 
concerned with language as the principal means of representation and dissemination in 
communicative acts and this has been the case regardless of which discipline has been attempting 
to model communication. In what follows, we seek to present a broader conception of the linguistic 
basis upon which many models of communication have rested. We do this from the standpoint of 
a linguist and a semiotician striving to present language in communication in holistic terms. We 
thus incorporate perspectives from linguistics, semiotics, psychology, philosophy, and 
anthropology in order to explicate the role and influence of (especially idiomatic) language in 
communication, along with its implication in cognition, rather than citing language as a 
communicative tool which is employed transparently in specific disciplinary settings (cf. Harmon 
et al 2015). In doing this, we present a new communication model which, like Schramm’s (1954), 
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comprises a circular diagram. In the face of linear and even rhizomatic models, the circular model 
stresses the ongoing, repetitive and often self-perpetuating nature of communication. Unlike 
Schramm’s model of communication, however, the communicative wheel aims to conceptualize 
key moments of punctuation and flow in the process of communication. It seeks to recast 
communication in both what Craig (1999: 136-40) would call semiotic terms, where 
communication is “a process of signification that mediates subjectivities” and in phenomenological 
terms, where “communication is an experiential encounter of self and other” (Eadie and Goret 
2013: 31; cf. Craig 2013). The avowed transportation metaphor in our presentation is not designed 
to nullify any “cognitive effort” on the part of participants in communication, as Krippendorff’s 
(1993: 7) critique of such metaphors suggests. On the contrary, the phenomenological bearing of 
the model seeks to emphasize communication’s inherent dynamicity and its activization of three 
obligatory participants whose “cognitive autonomy” (Krippendorf 1993: 17) arises in tandem: the 
sender, the receiver, and reality itself in the form of a situation (cf. ‘action assembly theory’ – 
Greene 1997; Greene and Hall 2013). 
 
1.1. Words and utterances from a linguistic and semiotic point of view 
 
1.1.1. The traditional view: all linguistic entities are symbols 
 
The traditional Saussurean-based view holds that the word is a ‘symbolic’ sign which consists of 
an expression unit and a content unit, where the relationship between them is entirely arbitrary 
(Saussure 1916; for Saussure’s theory, see Holdcroft 1991; for the history of arbitrariness, see 
Lifschitz 2012). The arbitrariness is due to the fact that a word consists of linguistic sound 
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components, consonants and vowels, which in themselves do not have any meaning. These may be 
combined into a variety of words which all then become symbols (cf. Martinet 1949). These 
symbols may then be linked according to certain syntactic rules and, when linked, they come to 
stand for a more complex symbol, called an utterance, with its own expression and its own content 
(Bühler 1934; for Bühler’s theory, see Innis 2013; Wemer & Kaplan 2014). But the view that 
human language differs from all other communication systems by consisting of simple and 
complex symbols not only takes in words and utterances ‒ grammemes, i.e. grammatical 
morphemes such as a, the, -s and –ed in English, are also considered to be symbols. This is more 
or less implicit in all existing linguistic schools, from the various varieties of structuralism (cf. 
Bloomfield 1935; Hjelmslev 1943; Hockett 1958; Jakobson 1962) to the various linguistic 
paradigms which come after structuralism (Chomsky 1957; Halliday 1975; Lakoff 1987; Dik 1989; 
Hengeveld 2004). In Cognitive Linguistics, especially, it is explicit and constitutes a crucial point 
in itself (cf. Langacker 1999, 2008; Talmy 2001). Although Peirce says that “every word is a 
symbol. Every utterance is a symbol” (4.447), it is essential to point out that for him a symbol 
incorporates an index that in itself incorporates an icon. Peirce (2.260, 2.262) sees utterances in 
general as Dicents: one example is the Dicent Indexical Legisign (such as a street cry); another is 
the Dicent Symbolic Legisign (2.264), such as a proposition. Thus Peirce distinguishes between 
arbitrariness and convention (2.341), also attributes properties to the utterance which are not solely 
symbolic and concludes that the utterance is a sign that is “really affected by its object” (2.262). 
 The specific construction described above renders human language as a unique 
‘communication tool’; yet this traditional view has its clear limitations. For instance, in itself it 
does not enable a conception of language as embodied in human being, even while it points to 
properties that are not present in the communication of non-human animals. In the mere definition 
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of the word as a symbol the human body or the human brain are not foregrounded. The word is 
thus defined completely intrinsically with no connections to the users of the language and their 
interaction with the surrounding world (for a discussion of this, see Sun 2000; Vogt 2002; Taddeo 
& Floridi 2005). Moreover, when language features in any communication identified on the basis 
of the sender’s transfer of a message to the receiver in a certain setting and context, it makes no 
sense to argue that an utterance is a complex symbol. A symbol, in the traditional conception that 
is invoked when words are so described, is a static entity. It does not move and cannot move by 
itself. At this level of thinking, all words are symbols and therefore have to be learnt by heart one 
by one by the child (cf. Kany & Schröler 2014; Hoff 2009: 169f). As such, words have a life outside 
communication and are found, for example, in dictionaries, where they live a quiet life until 
somebody uses them. Yet, even taking this scenario seriously, then utterances cannot live a life 
outside communication (cf. Durst-Andersen 2008, 2009; cf. Harris 2009). If an utterance were to 
be taken, say, as a complex symbol consisting of simple symbols, then a child would have to learn 
all possible utterances by heart in order to be able to reproduce them later on in concrete 
communication situations. Of course, this completely contradicts common sense and completely 
undermines what is normally referred to as the productivity of language: thanks to grammar, a 
language can give expression to any old and any new thought, and they can all be understood by 
the hearer, if he or she is in a position to master the conditions, the context and the myriad 
inflections of the language in question. Hearers need not have previously heard a specific utterance 
in order to produce that utterance and to understand it (cf. Hockett 1963; Jakobson 1968; Lyons 
1977: 76; for a general discussion, see Baggio et al. 2012). 
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1.1.2. The new view 1: symbols have two contents  
 
Let us consider the understanding of ‘symbol’ that arises from Peirce’s sign triad. For Peirce, the 
sign has an expression unit, called a representamen, which is coupled to two other units, called 
object and interpretant, respectively (cf. Peirce 1953). For the purposes of exposition, it can be 
argued that part of the Peircean object is akin to an image (the object has other aspects for Peirce, 
but let us suspend those for the moment) and his interpretant corresponds to idea (ditto, re. 
suspension, for the interpretant) (cf. Durst-Andersen 2009). Bearing this in mind with reference to 
the human sign, each is a different kind of ‘content’ with its own important link to the human being. 
From this point of view, a word amounts to an ‘image-idea pair’. The image (object), even in its 
most abstract bearing, is the ‘sensuous’ content of the word ‒ it cannot help but be linked to the 
senses of the human body; while an idea is the mental content of the word ‒ not unconnected to the 
senses, but nevertheless geared towards a more identificatory or descriptive rather than sensory 
process in the human brain (see Figure 1).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
The expression rice pudding (linked to the sense of hearing originally), for example, will not only 
mediate an idea (which involves descriptors such as Artefact, Food, Mush, Dish, etc.) and a visual 
image (giving, for instance, appearance, form, dimension and colour), but certainly also involve an 
olfactory, a gustatory and perhaps even an autonomous somatosensory image, almost as if a person 
was apprehending “rice pudding” through the senses. Without assuming the existence of these 
images it is difficult to explain how and why people are capable of recognizing “rice pudding” 
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when smelling it, tasting it and touching it without looking at it, or even being told beforehand that 
it will be present. It is important to note that the image/object plays a crucial role in associative 
processes and to acknowledge that we are considering an issue related to, but somewhat more 
primal, than those of ‘action assembly theory’ (Greene 1989). So, if you see “rice pudding” in a 
picture, this will not only provoke the idea of that dish, but also some (admittedly moderate) 
connection to the taste or smell of it. Try thinking of any desirable foodstuff when you are hungry 
to gain an impression of the point made here. The existence of these associative links is one reason 
why companies are willing to pay huge sums for commercials.  
 In this way, language can be said to mediate perception and cognition (cf. Durst-Andersen 
2011, 2012). Unlike the ideational content of a lexeme which has only one mental representation 
(consisting, however, of several descriptors, viz. Category, Function, Subfunction, Location, 
Means, Object, etc.), the image content has several representations, but the two contents are linked 
to the expression unit or mediated by the expression unit. All three components comprise a network 
and, as a word and being part of a person, that network amounts to what is called an engram in 
neuropsychology (cf. Semon 1921; for its present status, see Bruce 2001; Dudai 2004; Josselyn 
2010): that point where all traces of the memory of feelings, activities and thoughts are stored. 
 How does this view differ from traditional perspectives on words? The trichotomic view 
represents a departure in that it offers a means to consider human being and establishes a connection 
between the human body and the human brain. When a child learns the meaning of rice pudding, 
it is likely that it will first learn the image content and only later the idea content (corresponding to 
what is traditionally called emotions and thoughts in psychology and related disciplines, cf. 
Solomon 2004; Nussbaum 2001). One might say that the image content will form the input, its 
experience of “rice pudding” for the child, while the idea content will form its intake, its more 
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profound understanding of “rice pudding” being a certain kind of food. The order of acquisition is 
crucial. Yet, also from the point of view of language itself, the trichotomic view is very different 
from the dichotomic one: we will argue that the arbitrariness exists between the expression and its 
image content, but certainly not between the expression and its idea content ‒ here the relation is 
well motivated (see also Panther 2013). That is why “rice pudding” is called rice pudding in 
English, a sort of “pudding” made from “rice”. As such, arbitrariness and convention (as suggested 
by Peirce, cf. above) should be kept strictly apart which they have not been so far. The conventional 
side or law-like aspect of language should be understood in a broader way than arbitrariness, since 
it concerns not two sides, but all three sides of the sign symbol. That specific expression units are 
linked to specific images as well as specific ideas in a specific language community is due to 
convention. So when it is argued that members of a language community share a code, it actually 
means from the point of view of the verbal repertoire that they share identical engrams: the use of 
a word in a communication situation means that the same button is pressed and thereby the same 
neurophysiological network is automatically activated. The identical or almost identical network 
is extremely important, because it underlines the so-called binding effect of language: not only does 
it bind the two participants in a communication situation, but it also binds the members of a society 
speaking the same language. The former was questioned by Luhmann (1995) who stressed the 
distance-creating effect of language, the latter by Habermas (2012) who used Bühler’s three 
language functions to show its conflict-creating effect.  
 
1.1.3. The new view 2: an utterance involves three indexes  
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If a sentence/utterance is not the kind of sign that is a symbol, then what is it? In one formulation, 
Peirce (1953) distinguishes three kinds of signs at the level of their relation to their object, viz. 
icons, indexes, and symbols. Only indexes have a relation of causality inhering in themselves: if 
you see a red light in a street, you will probably stop; if you see a green light, you will probably 
start to move; if you see some smoke, it is likely you will immediately look for the fire; if you hear 
the utterance “There is a free parking space between the green van and the white Buick just 200 
yards in front of you”, you may drive 200 yards at once and use this utterance as a model to find 
what you need. From this, one can conclude that while words are symbols in Peirce’s terminology, 
attached to their objects and interpretants according to law or convention, then grammemes, i.e. the 
grammatical valencies attached to words, must be indexes. This explains why words are static 
when they stand alone, i.e. live as only dictionary units, supported only by convention, but 
automatically turn into dynamic units when they become part of an utterance in which words have 
grammatical prefixes or suffixes. When a word is alone – for example, rice pudding, it is impotent 
and its powers of reference are very limited; but together with grammemes – for example, “What 
a rice pudding!”, it becomes omnipotent by comparison. The word becomes both open-ended in its 
import as well as directly signified.  
Thus we argue that an utterance is not automatically a symbol, but has a predominantly 
indexical character. Later we shall argue that an utterance, as such, incorporates not one, but three 
different kinds of indexes: one that points at the sender, called a symptom, another that points at 
the receiver, called a signal, and a third one that points at a situation in reality, called a model (cf. 
Durst-Andersen 2011: 151ff). This means that an utterance is inherently a communicative unit ‒ it 
cannot do otherwise than communicate in the sense that it has a strong frame of reference. One 
might say that the existence of three obligatory participants each with its own voice makes 
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communication something that is inherently characterized by polyvocality (cf. Bakhtin 1994 
[1929]). The dynamism of the communication situation is, however, not only due to the different 
perspectives involved in the three types of indexes: symptoms have a first person perspective, 
signals a second person perspective, and models a third person perspective. Their dynamism is also 
due to their different time orientations: symptoms go back in time, signals go forward in time, and 
models are potentially timeless and therefore applicable to all times. Hence, Hippocrates was able 
to recognize all three in the service of diagnosis and prognosis. Together in the sphere of words, 
all three can be said to transform a sentence into an utterance involving a story-telling motion 
picture with a beginning, a middle, and an end. 
 
 
1.2. Reality and its place in communication science 
 
1.2.1. Discussing reality’s existence in the communication situation and in the human mind 
 
Traditionally, in philosophy of science, a clear distinction is made between realists and idealists. 
This discussion is deemed irrelevant for much of communication science, since communication 
takes place between two participants, a sender and a receiver and, although it may concern external 
reality, the situations referred to are, strictly, never touched by language. Messages go from the 
sender to the receiver and back again, but they do not directly impinge on the situation in external 
reality that obtains at the moment of communication. The situation is typically an entity in the 
sender’s mind and in the receiver’s mind, as evinced by Jakobson’s (1960) definition of it as 
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“understood” by sender and receiver. By contrast, we rather think that the discussion of reality’s 
existence in communication processes should be approached in a different manner.  
 First, if we look at the conventional S-M-R (sender-message-receiver) view of 
communication, it is agreed that a communication situation always involves three obligatory 
participants: a sender, a receiver, and something to which the message refers (e.g. a ‘reality’). But 
in a communication situation the ‘reality’ is ambiguous. It manifests itself in three different ways:  
 
• the situation in the reality common to the sender as well as the receiver;  
• the sender’s experience of that situation; and  
• the receiver’s experience. 
 
Secondly, when human beings process visual stimuli, it seems to happen in three steps (see Figure 
2), following Piaget’s classification of identification, assimilation and accommodation as the 
cognitive functions applied to the three stages (Piaget 1954; Piaget & Inhelder 1966). To argue that 
the processing of visual stimuli has three stages is tantamount to saying that reality exists in three 
modalities in our human brain. Let us take an illustrative example. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
 Julia comes into her office and immediately sees a note on her desk that was not there when 
she left her office. The note on her desk is a ‘stable’ picture corresponding to a visual experience 
of a state which consists of a figure, a note, against a ground, her desk. This state functions as input. 
Her visual experience is, however, not identical to her understanding. Knowing that the state is 
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new, she will automatically infer that somebody produced an activity which caused this state to 
appear. In other words, she understands that a successful action, an event, took place. This is her 
intake. Now Julia has a visual experience of reality as well as a conceptually-based understanding 
of reality ‒ she has an input as well as an intake. But the story does not stop here. Julia will store 
what she experienced and what she understood. She will store the state as a ‘stable’ picture, because 
she saw a ‘stable’ picture ‒ there was no ‘unstable’ picture, because she did not witness the activity 
of it being moved to the place on her desk. Moreover, she will store her understanding in 
propositional-semantic terms, i.e. as a thought. We shall call reality’s third way of existence in the 
human brain ‘outcome’ which is a combination of the experience-based input and the 
comprehension-based intake (see also Durst-Andersen 2012). 
 These three steps are usually referred to as sensory memory, working memory and long term 
memory by psychologists (cf. Atkinson & Schiffrin 1968; see also Cowan 2008; Schweppe & 
Rummer 2014). Thus, in principle there is nothing substantially new in the scenario outlined above. 
But, for our purposes, we name them in terms of their products: 
 
• the input is the cognitive product of identification and this is handled by sensory memory;  
• the intake is the cognitive product of assimilation and this is handled by working memory; and 
• the outcome is the cognitive product of accommodation and this is handled by long term 
memory. 
 
We shall argue that the three processing steps with their three cognitive products are directly related 
to how human beings communicate with one another through language. In our case it must be 
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emphasized that we shall focus entirely on British English, since we cannot exclude that other 
varieties of English may work slightly differently due to different conventions.  
 
 
 
1.2.2. Reality exists in three modalities 
 
Reality, in the above scenario and in communicative situations, does not exist as an omnipresent 
objective sphere of existence. Rather, it exists in three modalities. Moreover, there are obvious 
correlations between the three stages any visual stimulus goes through in the human mind and the 
three obligatory participants in a communication situation. The input stage and the sender share the 
notion of experience. The intake stage and reality share the notion of situation, be that a state, an 
activity, an event (a state caused by an activity), or a process (an activity intended to cause a state) 
(cf. von Wright 1974). Although the outcome stage and the receiver do not seem to have anything 
in common, they do share something: the condensed synthesis of the input and the intake. This is 
the outcome: in the same way a piece of new or old information to the receiver is a condensation 
of the sender’s experience of a situation compared to that of the receiver.  
 If human beings process visual (as well as olfactory, gustatory and somatosensory) stimuli 
in these three broad steps, it could be the case that people also communicate by using the same 
three steps. Their order, however, cannot be identical, because communication stereotypically ends 
with the cognitive process ‘understanding’ and not simply the complete storage of the sender’s 
experience and his/her understanding. Nevertheless, the way we store information as a combination 
of experience and thought, seems to match the way language is built up: by images (Peircean 
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objects in the dimension of experience) and by ideas (Peircean interpretants, thoughts provoked by 
the sign relation), as well as the situation, apprehended by no means in its entirety by sender and 
receiver but through the indicators of mere qualities in expression units (Peircean representamens). 
Provided these parallels exist, communication must consist of three steps and three products. If this 
proves to be the case, then it will be far easier to describe and explain how the sender’s speech 
production and the receiver’s speech reception fit ordinary cognitive processes going on in our 
brain as well as sensory processes going on in our body through the brain (cf. Solomon 2004; 
Nussbaum 2001). 
 
 
1.3. Communication as gift exchange  
 
Non-verbal communication in humans, differs profoundly, we would argue, from ordinary verbal 
communication (see, for instance, Kendon 1995, 2014; McNeill 1992). Nevertheless, we would 
hold that non-verbal communication has qualities that carry over to, and inform, verbal 
communication. Both involve symptoms, signals and models. What differentiates them is that non-
verbal communication is not based on symbols, whereas symbols, in the shape of words, have a 
central role to play in verbal communication. 
Non-verbal communication such as distress signals or handshakes are strongly performative 
(Austin 1961; Searle 1969): the sender tries to set in train an action by ‘constating’ it to the receiver. 
In order to produce a perlocution, the receiver has to recognize and accept the illocutionary force 
of the communication. By way of the perlocution the world is either changed (there is a response 
to the distress call) or, by failure to grasp the illocutionary force, it remains the same (the receiver 
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is scared off by the distress call). Non-verbal communication does not involve elements that match 
the function of words in verbal communication and it is for this reason that previous attempts to 
propose a ‘grammar’ of gestures or postures have been futile. Non-verbal communication is not 
built upon independent and discrete symbols, a fact recognized by early scientific investigators into 
animal communication who were able to establish that non-human animals communicated by way 
of messages, strings of signs, rather than individual signs (Marler 1961: 312). Furthermore, non-
verbal communication is bound not by convention alone but by context and situation, so it tends to 
be composed of indexes and icons (which may, later, become formalized into symbols, especially 
through habit). To be able to process non-verbal communication thoroughly, receivers need a 
pragmatic orientation, a form of problem solving, as in the response of reaching for the cat food 
when the family feline rubs its flank against your leg, an interaction that also gains with habit.  
Verbal communication may, of course, involve problem solving. Yet it does so by proposing 
a solution in a declarative (e.g., You can put the bag in my room), by solving it directly by using 
an imperative (e.g., Put the bag in my room, please!), or by stating a problem by using a question 
(Could you put the bag in my room?). Quotidian communication should be compared to a particular 
kind of gift giving or gift exchange based on the principle of reciprocity (cf. Mauss 1925; see also 
Sherry 1983; Osteen 2002; Adloff 2016). However, unlike gift exchange where the donor may put 
the gift directly in the hands of the receiver, the sender cannot give the receiver the “communicative 
gift” directly ‒ the gift has to be wrapped in a gift package which has to be unwrapped by the 
receiver. And just like a gift package contains a hidden gift, a verbal gift package (a message) 
contains the purport which is also hidden. Non-verbal communication seems to lack this wrapping 
element – it often seems direct in its indexical bearing. It goes without saying, that in order to get 
access to what Goffman (1959) called expressions given (deliberately communicated information) 
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and expressions given off (involuntary expressive behavior that gives the receiver information 
about the sender) investigation of communication must involve both verbal and non-verbal 
communication. Here we shall concentrate solely on verbal communication. 
For the inventor of modern gift-giving theory, Mauss (1925), giving, taking and reprocating 
were considered to reproduce society. At the same time, the gift was not seen as an inanimate 
object. After the donor has handed the object over to the receiver, it is still part of the donor and as 
such the donor has power over the receiver through the gift. In this way, the gift is simultaneously 
given and kept, because it retains the inalienable property of the donor who transfers only 
possession of it. A gift is a symptom of freedom, but also a signal to give a counter-gift, and in this 
way gift-giving establishes a kind of social contract (cf. Osteen 2002). We see a lot of similarities 
between gift-giving and verbal communication, and just as anthropologists and philosophers are 
investigating the invisible gap between giving and responding (for its research history, see Adloff 
2016), we want to investigate the more or less invisible gap between the sender’s speech intention 
and the receiver’s interpretation of it and his response. In doing that we focus on tacit knowledge 
that manifests in the practical knowledge of how something is done (cf. Polanyi 1958: 4) and views 
communication as a kind of cooperation. 
 
 
 
2. Stating the problems to be solved 
 
2.1. Discussing the cab scenario 
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Let us illustrate some of the fundamental problems with existing communication process models 
by taking our starting point in the following scenario.   
 
Scenario 1 
Sandra catches a cab just outside her apartment that is going to take her to the final interview 
at what could become her new job. She is reading some important documents relevant for 
the interview. Suddenly the cab stops. She notices it, but thinks that it stopped because of a 
red light. Since the cab does not move for quite some time, she looks up and realizes that 
the cab is placed in the middle of a traffic jam. She looks at her watch and gets nervous: if 
the traffic jam is not resolved in a couple of minutes, she will be late for the interview. She 
feels that she is trapped in the cab and she feels that she cannot do anything about it despite 
the fact that she wants to. It takes quite some time to resolve the traffic jam and she is late 
for the interview. When Sandra enters the meeting room, she says: Sorry for the delay. I 
got trapped in a cab. The CEO nods and accepts her apology for turning up late because 
she had been sitting in a cab that, for reasons beyond her control, was trapped in a traffic 
jam. 
 
If we concentrate on the utterance, I got trapped in a cab, it contains what we shall call a 
‘communicative paradox’. The receiver’s understanding of the utterance, his intake, “She was 
sitting in a cab that, for reasons beyond her control, was trapped in a traffic jam”, is not easily 
arrived at through the output, the message itself as a string of symbols. In the message as it should 
be taken, “sitting” or “traffic jam” are not mentioned at all. There is a missing link which delivers 
the intake to the heart of the utterance. Nevertheless, there is a consensus regarding  
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• the intake, the receiver’s communicative product which finalizes the communicative event, and  
• the output, the communicative product which serves as the mediating link between the sender, 
Sandra, and the receiver, the CEO.  
 
By securing the latter they appear to have a ‘common voice’. In traditional models of 
communication (for example, Jakobson 1960), such a common voice is usually labeled a ‘code’, 
often reifying the process to create the impression that the sender and receiver have joint access to 
a set of one-to-one or this-means-that rules, such as ‘The Highway Code’, to which sender and 
receiver must adhere. We propose that what is usually referred to as ‘code’ is divided into three 
subcodes: one on the part of the sender, responsible for the input; one which is responsible for the 
output constituting the sender’s and receiver’s common voice, which we call the modulator; and 
the one which is responsible for the receiver’s intake.  
Thus, the sender also made her own contribution to the communicative event, just like the 
receiver; but, since it is neither the communicative product nor the receiver that decides how to 
name the situation referred to, it must be the sender who alone is responsible for choosing the 
wording. The way Sandra named the situation, I got trapped in a cab, suggests that she actually 
did not name the situation itself in which “the cab she was sitting in was stuck in a traffic jam”, but 
uttered her experience of that situation: she felt that she was caught in the cab, but she also felt that 
she could not do anything about it despite really wanting to punctually arrive at her important 
appointment. What this suggests is that the sender makes his/her contribution in the form of a 
description of his/her own experience of a situation with which s/he is confronted. This is the 
sender’s ‘input’. In that way we get three contributions from three communicative participants, i.e. 
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(1) the sender’s input; (2) the modulator’s output, i.e. the common voice shared by the sender and 
the receiver; and (3) the receiver’s intake.  
 As we have stated, ‘the situation’ is often taken to be the third active participant besides the 
sender and the receiver, but since the key thing here is the way in which the sender and the receiver 
have agreed to talk about situations in reality ‒ called the ‘common voice’ ‒ it cannot be the 
situation itself that participates in communication and anchors the communicative product. The 
situation is indeed present, but only before the sender’s input and after the receiver’s intake. 
Strictly, it is not omnipresent as either a backdrop or perfusing the message. The situation (the 
communicative gift) cannot be carried directly by the sender to the receiver; it has to be prewrapped 
in the sender’s mental universe, then the sender’s experience of the situation has to be wrapped 
into pieces of information designed specifically for the given receiver, and, finally, the receiver has 
to unwrap the whole message package in exactly the opposite order to begin to encounter the 
situation. Yet, unlike the sender who actually was physically present in the situation referred to, 
the receiver will never be able to physically get access to that situation; the receiver’s encounter 
with the situation will be psychological, through her/his mental models (cf. Johnson-Laird 1983). 
This is the essential difference between gift giving and verbal communication: you can give a gift 
to a receiver without wrapping it in paper, but you simply cannot give a communicative gift directly 
without wrapping it. And the important thing is that we are talking about wrapping it, not once, but 
twice: prewrapping from the point of view of the sender and wrapping from the point of view of 
the receiver.  
 
2.2. Discussing the murder scenario 
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Let us take another example to illustrate the paradox of situation in communication (see below). 
 
Scenario 2 
A young girl, Maria, has been brutally killed in a cellar in a small town. The story is in 
every news media outlet. The day after the murder a white male who lived in the same 
building where Maria was killed is taken to prison by the local police who are convinced 
that she was killed by him. This impression is shared by the media and then the public. In 
short, there is a consensus that the actual killer has been found. A DNA test is taken. When 
the result of this test is revealed after some time, it turns out that the person is innocent. 
When the news about this is broadcasted on the local television station, the broadcaster 
begins the story by saying: Maria’s murderer was innocent. For viewers/listeners, there 
was immediate understanding that “the person we believed to be Maria’s murderer has been 
found to be innocent of that murder”. 
 
As suggested above, the utterance Maria’s murderer was innocent will normally mean that “The 
person we believed to be Maria’s murderer has been found to be innocent of that murder”. This is 
the receiver’s intake; but this intake has very little to do with the actual utterance, the output, in 
which the person is named Maria’s murderer ‒ although he did not kill her as the DNA analysis 
showed. The distance between what the message explicitly says ‒ and the receiver’s intake is even 
bigger in this case compared to the cab-scenario. But the paradox remains the same: how is it 
possible to explain that the sender says one thing, but the receiver understands it in another way? 
Why did the sender name the person Maria’s murderer, although in the same utterance consisting 
of four words the newscaster presents the receiver with an opportunity that allows both of them to 
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deny that to be the case. Of course, the newscaster, and with him many others who knew about the 
murder case, believed that prior to the DNA report the person to whom they were referring was 
“Maria’s murderer”. In that case, the sender’s input would be Maria’s murderer IS innocent. This 
is a combination of the sender’s belief and what he learnt from the DNA report released by the 
police. Both belong to the mental universe of the sender. But how can we explain that the actual 
utterance, the output, involves the past tense form was?  
The use of the past tense seems to be strange in view of the fact that it is an important piece 
of new information and, moreover, the utterance unambiguously refers to the present world. The 
only way in which we can explain the use of the past tense is by assuming that the sender’s input 
has been framed for the receiver as a signal in order for him to change his present world of beliefs 
by putting Maria’s murderer is caught into his past world of beliefs where it rightly belongs. 
Having received the signal through the output and having acted accordingly, the receiver is now 
able to anchor the information in a situation in reality. This is done by finding the mental model 
corresponding to the situation in question. By doing that, the receiver arrives at the intake, “The 
person we believed to be Maria’s murderer is found innocent of that murder”. Yet, as can be seen, 
there is still a residue of past experience ‒ the speaker’s past world of beliefs ‒ that lingers, both 
for the sender and the receiver to be able to decode the contradiction, “innocent murderer”. Again, 
the situation is bracketed from the communication in favour of the image-idea pair in the human 
sign. 
 
 
2.3. Discussing what is common to both scenarios 
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The examination of the two scenarios reveals another serious problem that has to be solved by a 
communication process model. This might be called the ‘communicability mystery’. It is the object 
of the question: “How is it possible under these circumstances to communicate at all?” In all 
existing communication process models as well as in our description above, there is no direct 
contact between the sender and the receiver besides the message or the utterance itself, the output 
that is common to the sender and the receiver. We must, however, assume that the sender starts at 
one place and that the receiver ends at a place that is very similar. In the face of widespread 
miscommunication and skepticism regarding the telementational success of verbal communication, 
how can we explain those communicative events that seem to have been successful? If one could 
find the precise contact point or meeting place of sender and receiver, we would be able to say that 
the communicative circuit had been completed.  
The output is certainly common to the sender and the receiver; but what we seriously lack is a 
link from the receiver to the sender: not ‘feedback’, which is temporally second, but something that 
is directed at the sender simultaneously. If we can find that point where “the ends meet”, we can 
gain insight into how the sender’s starting point coincides with the sender’s end point. In that way, 
it would be possible to argue that the receiver has a chance to ‘test’ his/her understanding with the 
sender’s ‘intended’ meaning, the purport of the sender’s message (cf. Leech 1983). 
 
3. Introducing a new communication process model 
 
3.0. The communication process as a journey 
 
  
 
23 
In the following, we shall try to put the observations above into a more formalized model which is 
a strongly revised version of Bühler’s organon model made dynamic, open and reapplicable (see 
Figure 3).   
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
 The communication process is thought of as a journey where the sender travels from the 
departure station, Station 0, through Station 1 in order to deliver the message to the receiver at 
Station 2. The receiver gets the message and takes the train to Station 3, which is identical to Station 
0. Let us be more precise and more detailed in our description. The point is that when in scenario 
1 our sender said Sorry for my delay. I was trapped in a cab she said it at Station 2, but what she 
said was actually pre-coded when she arrived at Station 1.  
 The sender is situated in the external world. She realizes that “the cab she is sitting in is 
placed in the middle of a traffic jam”. This is the sender’s own understanding of the situation, her 
own intake arrived at by looking at a stable picture depicting the present state, “traffic jam”, which 
she infers must be the effect of hitherto unrevealed general transport problems. When the sender 
entered the meeting room, she wanted to give the CEO the description of her predicament, because 
this is the purport of her message – the experiential part of the image-ideas that she puts into use. 
One might say that the situation, wrapped in an experiential image-idea, is her personal ‘gift’ to 
the CEO. But her experience of the situation and the image-idea are also wrapped into a message 
according to some conventional rules, i.e. according to the way in which the sender and the receiver 
have tacitly agreed to render situations in reality. However, before activating this ‘modulator’ or 
‘common voice’, the sender uses her own voice by naming her personal experience of the situation 
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that occurred. This can be described in the following way in the Communicative Wheel (see Figure 
3). 
 
3.1. Going from Station 0 to Station 1 
 
When going from Station 0 to Station 1 the sender compares the external world, “the cab I am 
sitting in is placed in the middle of a traffic jam”, to her own internal world, in this case her world 
of feelings. The result of this comparison is her personal input to the communication process, I am 
trapped in this cab and I cannot do anything about it although I want to. Other people in the same 
situation might have named it otherwise, e.g., I am stuck in this cab or I am caught in this cab. 
What people name is their own choice and it is not determined by language as such – it is the 
constraints and affordances that are defined by language. Seen from a semiotic point of view, the 
input is a symptom of the sender’s experiences in both the broad and figurative sense of the term, 
but also in the indexical sense, having roots in the body. So what she named was the effect that the 
situation had on her feelings. In other words, when the sender arrives at Station 1, she has given 
her input to communication by investing or ‘precoding’ a symptom with the form of her own 
naming. Being at Station 1, the ‘situation medium’ has given way to the medium of experience. 
Put in another way, the first part of the journey could be conceived as one from the external world 
to the internal world of the sender. This is important. Now she leaves Station 1 with her prewrapped 
gift (see Fig. 3). 
 
 
3.2. Going from Station 1 to Station 2 
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When going from Station 1 to Station 2 the sender is involved in a process whereby her own internal 
world will be somehow related to the receiver’s. This means that what she has in her past store of 
experiences, knowledge, opinions and beliefs is offered for interaction with the corresponding 
stores of the receiver. This may feel like an automatic process learnt gradually when acquiring the 
mother tongue with all its idioms and idiosyncrasies, along with a whole range of personal and 
cultural attitudes commonly felt as being ‘in the blood’. The result of this comparison or interaction 
will be a piece of information with certain degrees of familiarity or unfamiliarity depending on the 
coinciding of the sender and receiver in interaction. Here the sender frames what has already been 
named. This means that the naming part becomes covert, i.e. presupposed by the framing part. 
In short, the sender presents her internal world in anticipation of the receiver coinciding 
with it; of course, the result is not guaranteed. Station 2 is a new medium: that of information. If, 
for instance, the sender’s experience is identical to the receiver’s experience, then it can be said 
that Station 2 is the site of old information. Usually, certain linguistic constructions can indicate or 
place senders and receivers on the same terrain: the definite article, the, for example, can work in 
this way. The indefinite article, a, tends to indicate that there is no coinciding of sender and receiver 
and that they are meeting in the territory of new information to the receiver. In order for new or old 
information to be correctly placed in the receiver’s internal world, in his mind, the sender will also 
signal whether it hails from the present store or the past store of experience. In other words, I got 
trapped in a cab is the way in which her named experience, I am trapped in the cab, is framed 
specifically for the consumption of the CEO, the specific receiver of the message. It functions as 
the output of the way in which the sender and the receiver have tacitly agreed to render situations 
in reality. One might say that it is the sender’s and the receiver’s ‘common voice’, or their 
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modulator. In short, the prewrapped gift has been finally wrapped for the specific receiver of the 
gift and has been delivered to that specific receiver. The sender remains at Station 2, ready to 
receive a counter gift from the receiver in his potentially future role as sender (see Fig. 3). 
 
 
3.3. Going from Station 2 to Station 3 
 
What the sender delivers at Station 2 has to be unwrapped. Between Station 0 and Station 1 the 
sender prewrapped the gift with materials designed to protect it and enable delivery. Between 
Station 1 and Station 2 she wrapped the gift in decorative paper specifically chosen in anticipation 
that the receiver would be able to divine the nature of the gift and the portion of her experience that 
is invested in it. When the old or new pieces of information are delivered to the receiver, the 
receiver leaves Station 2 in order to get to Station 3, but he will do it by mentally reconstructing 
the journey made by the sender.  
The receiver’s signal from the sender is to reconstruct the sender’s symptom, ultimately in his 
own body. If sender and receiver are coinciding, he knows that at the end of a signal is a symptom 
which at the same time has an attached model of the real situation referred to by the utterance. He 
cannot get access to the real situation but, through a model of it, he will understand the kind of 
situation that is being talked about.  
At the level of simple decoding, the answer to the question What caused her feeling of 
entrapment is sought. The answer is “The cab she was sitting in was stuck in a traffic jam and she 
was rendered helpless”. This is the receiver’s intake, his understanding of the utterance – whether 
he believes the sender is being sincere or not. So, even at this level, the gift that was prewrapped 
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and wrapped finally in decorative paper by the sender can be obtained by first unwrapping the 
decorative paper and then the protective inner wrapping. In doing this, the receiver arrives with his 
gift at Station 3 which appears to be identical to Station 0, the sender’s departure station. In this 
way the receiver anchors the information in a situation and now has an understanding of the 
“hidden” message, its purport. Of course, the item placed in the gift wrapping between Stations 1 
and 2 is not ‘identical’ to the gift that is with the receiver at Station 3. This is because of the different 
experience stores or the differences in ‘innenwelt’ (Uexküll 1921) of the sender and receiver.  
 The following point is vitally important: the receiver is now ready to take a new tour. This 
may, in principle, continue in perpetuity, even if it does not in reality. The receiver becomes sender 
by taking a step down and by making a new tour of the communicative wheel, while the sender 
becomes receiver by remaining at Station 2 ready to unwrap a gift package from his previous 
receiver. This is what Peirce (2.303, 2.92, 5.284) described as a kind of ‘infinite semiosis’ (see 
Figure 4). Sender and receiver are caught up, therefore, in the potential for infinite semiosis but, in 
practice, interrupt this potentiality with the invariant expedient of the ‘common voice’. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
What the wheel seeks to demonstrate – in the case of the present paper, through focus on the verbal 
part of two interactions – is that the process of communication automatically sets up access to the 
internal world of the sender and the receiver. As such, it confirms common sense understandings 
of communication as a process that ‘actually works’ in bringing two minds together, although it 
  
 
28 
does so with important semiotic qualifications. An utterance cannot but communicate, because the 
utterance is not a symbol removed from the body of the communication participants and the 
situation referred to, but a major index consisting of three indexes that are causally related to the 
body of the sender, to the receiver and to the world: the direction of the symptom goes from the 
sender to the situation referred to, the direction of the signal goes from the sender to the receiver 
and the direction of the model goes from the receiver to the situation. In that way a dynamical 
semiotic chain is created which shows that behind a signal one always finds a symptom and behind 
a symptom one always finds a model (see Figure 5, where the impact of the signal for the receiver 
is the focus). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
 
 Many models of communication imply that mediation is so extensive in communicative 
interactions that it prevents the meeting of two minds. On the other hand, what often gets lost in 
accounts of communication that tend toward a telementational perspective, suggesting the sender 
and the receiver do get into almost untrammelled contact with one another, is the empathetic 
dimension: the transfer of experience. Seen in these latter terms, the new model appears to offer 
new insights for folk psychology or Theory of Mind. In the latter version of this idea, the child 
starts to infer the intentions of others, including false beliefs, round the age of three and a half 
(Wimmer and Perner 1983) – a process described sometimes as if it is an almost ‘magical’ event 
and as if nothing had gone before. Yet, if children have begun to evaluate utterances according to 
the view of communication we have outlined here, then they are already engaged – at the least – in 
a prototypical form of empathy, as well as trading in beliefs and feelings. 
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 A further consequence of the indexical bearing of utterances is felt in the conceptualization 
of the situation of communication. The real states, activities, events, and processes that surround 
us and make up what is traditionally called reality are not held at bay by utterances. It is easy to 
assume that they are so held when proceeding from a conception of the word as purely symbolic. 
Yet, when the utterance is revealed as an index, it turns out that the communicative gift, the purport 
of a message wrapped in the English language, is a situation. This means that the sender starts in 
the external world by choosing a situation that s/he finds worth packaging into a message and that 
the receiver ends in that situation after having unwrapped the gift package, the message. It goes 
without saying that a situation need not be in the real world; it might be in an imagined world. The 
key thing is that sender’s experience or the information to the receiver could have been alternative 
gifts, but in British English they appear to reflect various stages of the gift packaging process.  
 Nevertheless, we must remain wary of the idea that single utterances or instances of 
communication will always be either ‘true’ or reveal ‘intent’. What we have called output is often 
figured as the message. This can be ambiguous in English for while ‘message’ is usually taken as 
the ‘utterance itself’ with its specific, analyzable, content and form, it can also signify a 
phenomenon imbued with ‘intent’ (“Do you get the message?”).  Yet the purport of the message ‒ 
the sender’s gift to the receiver ‒ is not the same as the full paraphernalia of the gift package. This 
latter contains ‘content’ plus two expression units with their own ‘content’: the sender’s experience 
and the information for the receiver. The isolation of the purport of the message (i.e. the sender’s 
gift to the receiver) from the message itself (i.e. the gift package) is the main and crucial difference 
between Shannon’s mathematical model of communication (1948), the ultimate heritage of all 
modern communication models, and our proposed model for human communication. Another 
important difference is that the sender and the receiver actually meet one another in our model with 
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the potential for success in communication instead of the potential of failure which runs through 
Shannon’s original paper (1948).  
 The Communicative Wheel, as a multimodal communication process model, does retain 
some of the flavour of Bühler’s organon model. The key difference, however, is the circular and 
cyclical movement of communication and its dynamism. Communication is susceptible of 
transformation at all stages of the wheel while also being punctuated by the movement from station 
to station. Of course, Station 3 is not the ultimate terminus; it is merely a staging post for the 
invariant during numerous revolutions of the wheel. This dynamism, we would conjecture, will 
make the model reapplicable. 
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